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Ricardian equivalence
The Ricardian equivalence proposition (also known as the Ricardo–De Viti–Barro equivalence theorem〔) is an economic hypothesis holding that consumers are forward looking and so internalize the government's budget constraint when making their consumption decisions. This leads to the result that, for a given pattern of government spending, the method of financing that spending does not affect agents' consumption decisions, and thus, it does not change aggregate demand. Thus, this theorem is used as an argument against tax cuts and spending increases aimed to boost aggregate demand.
==Introduction==
Governments can finance their expenditures either through taxes or by issuing bonds. Since bonds are loans, they must eventually be repaid—presumably by raising taxes in the future. The choice is therefore "tax now or tax later."
Suppose that the government finances some extra spending through deficits; i.e. it chooses to tax later. According to the hypothesis, taxpayers will anticipate that they will have to pay higher taxes in future. As a result they will increase their savings to pay the future tax increase; i.e. they reduce their current consumption to do so. The effect on aggregate demand would be the same as if the government had chosen to tax now.
David Ricardo was the first to propose this possibility in the early nineteenth century; however, he was unconvinced of its empirical relevance.〔 Antonio De Viti De Marco elaborated on Ricardian equivalence in the 1890s.〔''Handbook of public economics'', Martin Feldstein, Alan J. Aurbach, eds., North Holland (August 1, 1985) ISBN 978-0-444-87612-6〕 Robert J. Barro took the question up independently in the 1970s, in an attempt to give the proposition a firm theoretical foundation.〔〔
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
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